A biblical covenant is the combination
of a personal and legal bond between two parties, much like a
marriage is today between a man and his wife. When a covenant
is broken, the personal and legal ties either deteriorate or are
dissolved. To be restored as a viable covenant, both the personal
and the legal must be restored, simultaneously. Catholic baptism
does just that, since it infuses the individual with God's grace
and thus makes him personally pleasing to God; and this infusion
is also an indelible mark which gives him legal status as God's
adopted child (Council of Trent, Ses. 6, Ch 4). Law courts do
not have any room for, let alone accept, the personal dimensions
of biblical covenants.
In fact, if Protestants insist on making
justification solely a juridical enterprise, then this begs the
question, for we must then inquire what "faith" is doing in a
judicial proceeding? "Faith" is a volitional act of the will to
put personal trust in the other member of the covenant for the
mutual benefit of both. In a court of law, neither the judge nor
the jury cares whether the defendant exhibits personal faith in
the judge or the jury. Rather, defendants are determined to be
innocent or guilty. If the former, they are set free; if the latter,
they are punished. If the defendant is determined innocent and
set free, it makes no difference if the defendant says, "but I
don't believe in the judge or the jury, and I refuse to be ordered
by this court." At that, the judge will promptly call the baliff
to have the defendant removed from the court, for it does not
matter to the judge what the defendant personally believes about
him.
Moreover, if Protestants insist that NT
Justification is based on the juridical system of the Roman law
court, this becomes a problem since there is no known Roman law
(or Jewish law) that allows an innocent victim to take the legal
punishment of an accused criminal so that the accused can go free.
Dr. Horton's colleague, Alister McGrath, tried to find
such a connection in Roman private law, but the only thing he
found was a concept called acceptiliation, which, according
to McGrath, refers to the dissolution of an obligation by a verbal
decree on the part of the one to whom the debt was due, without
any form of payment having been exchanged (Iustitia Dei,
II, p. 45). But this does not fit the Protestant concept of Atonement
and Imputation, since the theory claims that Christ actually
paid the debt, not merely let the culprit go free without
anyone making a payment to the one owed. Thus, as it stands, there
is no legal precedent for the forensic atonement used in Protestant
soteriology.
This issue brings up another major difference
between the Protestant and Catholic views of the Atonement. Luther
and Calvin believed that, since justification was a purely legal
enterprise, this meant that Christ had to suffer the equivalent
of the legal punishment of the elect in order to redeem them.
In other words, Christ had to suffer the precise punishment they
would have sustained in Hell, whatever that punishment is.
Although no Father or medieval theologian
had ever entertained the idea that the statement in the Apostles
Creed that Christ descended into hell meant more than a release
of detained saints, the Reformers saw in the descent an opportunity
to buttress their forensic understanding of justification. They
interpreted the descent as the infliction of the torments of hell
on Christ in order to make a full legal payment for sin. Nicolas
of Cusa (1400-1464) and Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494)
were the first to introduce the idea that Christ sustained agony
in the descent into hell. Martin Luther held that Christ,
as God and man, literally entered hell to sustain God's wrath,
suffering the tortures of the damned.
John Calvin used these concepts
and was the first to produce the full-blown interpretation that
Christ assumed the legal guilt of the sin for the elect and was
justly punished with the torments of eternal damnation. He writes:
" But we must seek a surer explanation,
apart from the Creed, of Christ's descent into hell...If Christ
had died only a bodily death, it would have been ineffectual.
No-it was expedient at the same time for him to undergo the severity
of God's vengeance, to appease his wrath and satisfy his just
judgment. For this reason, he must also grapple hand to hand with
the armies of hell and the dread of everlasting death....By these
words he means that Christ was put in place of evildoers as surety
and pledge-submitting himself even as the accused-to bear and
suffer all the punishments that they ought to have sustained...No
wonder, then, if he is said to have descended into hell, for he
suffered the death that God in his wrath had inflicted upon the
wicked!" INT 2:16:10.
Suffice it to say, this is a thoroughly
unbiblical understanding of the Atonement. Christ did not suffer
the equivalent of an eternity in Hell. He suffered and died only,
and this was sufficient to appease the wrath of God so that grace
could be offered to mankind.
For more information on this, see my book
Not By Bread Alone, "The Nature of Christ's Sacrifice,"
pages 37-56, and "Appendix 5, A Critique of Protestant Views
of Penal Substitution," pages 333-342.
As for Dr. Horton's contention, ala Alister
McGrath, that
"...the best example of the errors in
the Latin Vulgate, corrected in tail end of the Renaissance, concerns
its translation of the Greek word 'dikaiosune,' which means 'to
declare righteous.' It is a legal term, a verdict. But the Latin
Vulgate had translated 'dikaiosune' with the Latin word iustificare,
which means 'to make righteous,'"
it can be easily shown that McGrath is
the one in error here. Here is an excerpt from my book Not
By Faith Alone which deals with McGrath's assertion:
In his work, Iustitia Dei, McGrath
maintains that in Augustine's translations, his Latin meanings
were not faithful to the Hebrew meanings. This echoes the assertion
of the German Lutheran, Martin Chemnitz (1522-1586), a
student of Melanchthon, who said that Augustine misrepresented
the Greek word dikaioun to refer to "making righteous"
instead of "declaring righteous." McGrath cites Chemnitz's view
on page 29, and elsewhere in the book attempts to show through
the etymology and usage of the Hebrew that tsedaqah is
a more general word than the Latin iustificare.
Hence, McGrath says Augustine's Latin translation
missed the "soteriological overtones" associated with the Hebrew
tsedaqah (p. 8). McGrath says these kinds of problems were
further complicated by the Greek word dikaiosune which
was also limited in scope due to its Aristotelian origins. To
support this position, McGrath cites several usages of the Greek
eleemosune ("mercy, alms") by the LXX to translate the
noun tsedaqah rather than the normal insertion of dikaiosune.
McGrath also cites the anomalies of where LXX uses dikaiosune
to translate tsedaqah in Lev. 19:36; Deut. 25:15; and Ezk.
45:10; in these instances the Hebrew merely carries the sense
of "accurate" not, as translated, "just."
In another example, McGrath cites the
translation in Deut. 33:19 which should be "correct sacrifices"
instead of "righteous sacrifices." Similarly, McGrath sees a weakness
in dikaiosune to translate the general scope of the Hebrew
verb tsadaq. He cites the LXX translation of Isaiah 5:22-23
and 43:26 as proof. As a result, McGrath is of the opinion that
the semantic range of the root dikaioun was expanded to
accommodate tsedaqah. McGrath suggests that the difficulty
comes to the fore when the "post-classical" Latin term iustificare
is used to translate the "expanded" forms of the dikaioo
derivatives.
More importantly, McGrath also asserts
that Greeks and Latins had decisively different ideas of the concept
of merit, and that this was the main cause for the Latin church's
emphasis on merit and the prevalence of merit in medieval theology.
According to McGrath, in Greek culture merit was only a matter
of "estimation" which is not inherent in its object, i.e., considering
an entity to be something that it is not in itself. McGrath asserts
that merit, in the Latin culture, refers to the quality inherent
in the object or person.
Representative of these two meanings,
according to McGrath, is the Greek passive axiousthai ("to
deem worthy") and the Latin equivalent, mereri. The Greek
word that would have denoted "inherent merit" is meroma,
from which the Latin meritum is derived. McGrath's conclusion:
the disjunction between axiousthai and mereri is
similar to the disjunction between dikaiosune and iustificare.
Hence the Greek word has the primary sense of being considered
righteous, whereas the Latin word denotes being righteous or the
reason one is considered righteous.
All in all, McGrath concludes that the
initial transference of a Hebrew concept, to a Greek concept,
to a Latin concept, led to a fundamental alteration in the concepts
of justification and righteousness as the gospel spread from Palestine
to the Western world (p. 15). Unfortunately, McGrath's linguistic
analysis and conclusion appear to read into history what his theology
dictates.
Despite the anomalies that always occur
in translating a word from one language to another, it is a matter
of certain faith that inspired Scripture, which translates Hebrew
text into Greek text, cannot err, and does not envision the problem
McGrath proposes. First, without reservation, the New Testament
authors use the dikaioo cognates to translate the Hebrew
and Septuagint cognates. These translations occur in many non-justification
contexts (i.e., "non-imputation" contexts).
For example, in 2 Cor. 9:9 Paul cites
a quotation from Psalm 112:9 and uses the Greek dikaiosune
to translate the Hebrew feminine noun tsadaqah (which the
LXX also translates as dikaiosune). The context of 2 Cor.
9:9-10 concerns liberal giving, both of God and men, to those
in need.
Thus, contrary to McGrath's thesis, dikaiosune
is understood as that which is inherent within both God and man
due to the good they have done. Similarly, Hebrews 1:9 uses dikaiosune
to translate the Hebrew male noun tsadaq in Psalm 45:7
(of which the LXX uses dikaiosune) and speaks of the inherent
righteousness of Christ. (The relevance of the LXX may be even
more significant here since Hebrews 1:6 is quoted by Paul directly
from the LXX).
In addition, 1 Peter 3:12 uses dikaioo
to translate the Hebrew adjective tsadeek of Psalm 34:15
(of which the LXX uses dikaious). The context of 1 Peter
3:12 regards righteous individuals as inherently righteous, for
it is they who "turn from evil to do good" and "seek peace and
pursue it." Similarly, Hebrews 11:7 uses dikaiosune to
describe the righteousness of Noah, translating the Hebrew adjective
tsadeek in Genesis 7:1 which refers to God seeing Noah as
inherently righteous for his goodness in the midst of the wicked
people of his day.
We should also add that Scripture does
not support McGrath's assessment of the Greek word axioo
to refer only to the estimation of an individual rather than his
merit (which he distinguishes from the Latin notion of merit that
gives the individual the "right" of the third party estimation,
i.e., because he is deserving of it). The New Testament uses axioo
not only in considering someone worthy but also in recognizing
someone worthy because he is actually worthy. For example, Hebrews
3:3 uses axioo in reference to Christ's worthiness: "Jesus
has been counted worthy of greater honor than Moses..." This is
a common usage of axioo and its cognates in the New Testament
(cf., 1 Thess. 1:11; 1 Tim. 5:17; Col 1:10; et al).
Thus we see that Dr. Horton relies on
faulty information in the analysis of Alister McGrath.
It is quite remarkable that the Roman Church would continue
to embrace its erroneous view of justification, given the advances
in scholarship by their own best minds. This is true not only
of the 16th century; many Roman Catholic biblical scholars of
our own day recognize that the Roman position is untenable in
the light of the biblical text. I am not only referring to such
controversial theologians as Hans Kung, but to the accepted
interpretations of Roman doctrine. Bearing the nihil obstat and
Imprimatur of the Roman Church, Sacramentum Mundi is a
modern encyclopedia of Roman doctrine. In its article on Justification
we read that justification "implies a relation with a judgment
rather than a mode of being." The term for Paul, "always has a
certain forensic flavour which prevents its becoming a mere synonym
of regeneration or re-creation. In later theology, however, this
sense is often lost, and justification comes to mean nothing more
than the infusion of grace (D 799). Now when St. Paul applies
the juridical terminology to the new Christian reality, it acquires
an entirely new meaning. It refers now not to the future but to
the past (Rom.5:9), not to the just man but the sinner (Rom.4:5).
And so the basis of justification must also be different. It can
no longer be observance of the law. It must be Christ, whom God
has made our righteousness and sanctification and redemption (1
Cor.1:30), which is the same thing as saying that we are justified
by faith in Christ (Rom.3:28)." [ by Ricardo Franco, pp.
239-240]
Furthermore, arguably the two most widely respected Roman Catholic
biblical scholars, J. A. Fitzmyer and Raymond Brown,
have recognized that justification is understood in the biblical
text to mean legal acquittal and not a process of growth in inherent
righteousness. "Justification in the Old Testament," writes Fitzmyer,
"denotes one who stood acquitted or vindicated before a judge's
tribunal...This uprightness (righteousness) does not belong to
human beings (Rom. 10:3), and is not something that they produced
or merited; it is an alien uprightness, one belonging to another
(Christ) and attributed to them because of what that other had
done for them...This justification comes about by grace and through
faith" (Romans, AB 33, pp.116-19).
4) Dr. Horton has given us the key word
in his assessment of Sacramentum Mundi, that is, it is
a "modern" encyclopedia of Roman doctrine. Sacramentum Mundi does
not speak officially for the Catholic Church. Today's Catholic
Church is filled with modernist theologians who, in varying degrees,
have denied everything from the resurrection of Christ, to the
plenary inspiration and inerrancy of Scripture, to the Real Presence
of Christ in the Eucharist; and, as we can see above, the traditional
and dogmatic teaching on Catholic justification.
The Council of Trent, which is the only
officially infallible proclamation of the Catholic Church on Justification,
never taught that justification was legal in nature, nor that
the term "justified" contained a "forensic flavor." Dr. Horton
knows this, and it is precisely the reason why he took the time
to quote above from six of Trent's canons on Justification - -
to show how "heretical" Trent was in its formulations.
Now Dr. Horton has a dilemma. (1) Knowing
that Trent is the only infallible dogma in the Catholic Church
on Justification; and that (2) Sacramentum Mundi (in the
representation of "Ricardo Franco" who wrote the article
on Justification) is not infallible but merely the ideas of some
Catholic theologians who have been heavily influenced by Protestants
in the last 30 years, what does Dr. Horton do? He can't side with
Trent; he can only attack Trent. But in attacking Trent, he is
attacking the infallible doctrine of the Catholic Church, which
he knows will never change, and cannot change, no matter how many
"Catholic" theologians try to change it. (NB: This is not the
first time in Catholic history in which "Catholic" theologians
have tried to change Catholic doctrine, each time being unsuccessful,
and Dr. Horton knows it).
So what is Dr. Horton's only choice? To
make a concerted effort to drive a wedge between the Council of
Trent and modern Catholic theologians. The attempt is to make
Trent look obsolete, out-of-step, and, in the end, quite wrong.
But what Dr. Horton fails to see is that, the greater the wedge
he drives between Trent and modern Catholic theologians, the greater
the exposure he places upon the modern Catholic theologians as
representing, in the estimation of the Council of Trent, a heretical
view of justification. It is inevitable. In other words, Dr. Horton
is merely proving my assertion that Fr. Raymond Brown and Fr.
Joseph Fitmeyer are teaching things contrary to the Council of
Trent.
Dr. Horton also proves that views such
as Ricardo Franco's do not represent the Catholic view of Justification,
regardless whether Dr. Franco uses the term "Catholic" or writes
in a Catholic book inscribed with the Nihil Obstat of a Catholic
bishop. In reality, what has really happened in the last 35 years
is that various modern Catholic theologians have been corrupted
by the views of various Protestant theologians, especially from
the liberal theological ranks. The most notable of these Protestant
corrupters are Rudolph Bultmann and Karl Barth,
among others.
After Pius XII allowed Catholic theologians
to see if anything good could come out of "higher biblical criticism,"
which had been used by Protestants for more than a century, Catholic
theologians, such as Karl Rahner, Eduard Schillebeeckx, Hans
Kung, Teilhard de Chardin, and many others, began using higher
criticism as an excuse to depart from traditional Catholic teaching,
and as a result, foisted all kinds of aberrant ideas both on Scripture
and on Catholic teaching. As Protestant John MacQuerrie
of Union Theological Seminary has noted in regard to liberal theology,
the Catholics "took the torch" from the Protestants.
Up until his death a couple of years ago,
Fr. Raymond Brown was THE torchbearer for liberal theology
in US Catholicism, and Joseph Fitzmyer of Catholic University
is right behind him. Fr. Brown was the very one who advanced the
heretical idea that Scripture is only inerrant in matters of salvation
(ie., that it can err in matters of history, and very often does.
See his Jerome Biblical Commentary, page 1169). Yet Fr.
Brown was made head of the Pontifical Biblical Commission at the
Vatican. This shows you how the liberals at the Vatican make sure
their own people get the appointments. No one in all of Catholic
history has ever advanced the idea that Scripture is inerrant
only in matters of salvation, yet Fr. Brown and his new view of
Scripture was allowed to have one of its highest chairs. In fact,
in opposition to views similar to Fr. Brown's, five Popes since
1864 have officially stated as Catholic dogma that Scripture,
".in all its parts, each and every one, is free from every error.without
distinction" (Leo XIII, Pius X, Benedict XV, Pius IX, Pius
XII). How does Fr. Brown view
the Pope's statements? He tries to tone them down as best he can,
and has convinced a number of Catholic theologians that indeed
the emperor has new clothes.
I do know a certain thing about Dr. Horton.
He believes that Scripture is inerrant in all that it proclaims,
for that is standard Protestant evangelical teaching, with only
a few detracters. Dr. Horton would have to call Fr. Raymond Brown's
view of inerrancy "heretical," for he gives the same label to
liberal Protestants who believe there are mistakes in the Bible.
So it seems that Dr. Horton and Fr. Brown are in very different
camps on very fundamental issues.
The issue of Justification, however, makes
strange bed-fellows these days, especially when Catholic theologians,
such as Fr. Brown and Fr. Fitzmyer, start saying that justification
is forensic. All kinds of Protestant ears begin to perk up, and
suddenly Fr. Brown becomes their long-lost friend, even though
Fr. Brown repudiates Dr. Horton's view of biblical inerrancy,
and many other doctrines that Dr. Horton holds dear to him. These
are the kinds of days we are living. Alliances that we would never
think possible are happening all the time. One look at the Lutheran/Catholic
Joint Declaration on Justification will show that with a little
'snip' here and a little 'cut' there, virtual theological enemies
475 years ago can now become the best of friends. This is even
more ironic since I am acquainted well enough with Dr. Horton
to know that he would not endorse the Lutheran/Catholic Joint
Declaration (and I believe he has gone on record against it),
for it is virtually empty of the Reformed distinctives by which
he molds his soteriology.
Now, where do all the modern ideas about
Justification in the Catholic Church originate? From the liberal
Catholic theologians noted above (de Chardin, Rahner, Kung, Schillebeeckx,
et al); not from orthodox Catholics. Even 400 years after Trent
(and prior to Pius XII's Divino Afflante Spiritu in 1943)
you couldn't find a Catholic theologian who would even entertain
the idea that Justification was forensic, let alone endorse it
in writing. One of the great Catholic commentaries, A Commentary
on Holy Scripture by Dom Bernard Orhard, written at
the turn of the 20th century, repudiates forensic Justification,
as do all the others in that genre.
So, in the end, we find that Dr. Horton's
citing of Franco, Brown, Fitmyer, et al, really doesn't amount
to much. All it shows is that there are some Catholic theologians
who have attempted to change traditional Catholic thinking. This
has happened many times in our Catholic history. In fact, I don't
know of any century in our two-thousand year history which has
been immune from it. But faithful Catholics need not worry, for
in due time the errors will be exposed and they will be eradicated.
It just takes some time to do so. The Arians weren't totally squashed
for five centuries. Fr. Brown's and his theological comrade's
aberrant ideas about Catholic Justification are relatively young
and novel, that is, compared to other heresies that have come
and gone in the Catholic Church. Fifty years of suffering with
Fr. Brown's aberrant teaching is negligible when put on the scale
of the duration of heresies in other centuries of the Catholic
Church. In the meantime, God allows their aberrant ideas to surface
and flourish for a while, for as St. Paul says in 1 Corinthians
11:19 "For there must also be heresies among you, in order that
those who are approved may become evident among you." God has
a purpose to everything, even to the wayward ideas of Dr. Horton
and Fr. Brown.
1 2
3 4
5 6
7