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Rebuttal to Dr. Michael S. Horton on:
"Is Justification by Faith Alone?"
page 2
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3) No Protestant has ever proved that dikaiosune is exclusively, or even preponderantly, a legal term. More specifically, there is no verse of Scripture that classifies dikaiosune as a legal term. Protestants claim that Paul is borrowing the meaning of dikaiosune from the Roman law court. Unfortunately for them, Paul never cites the Roman law court, or any legal terminology in vogue in the Roman legal system during that time, when he uses dikaiosune or its derivatives in the NT. Paul uses the model of the biblical Covenant as his one and only framework to explain justification, not the Roman law court.


A biblical covenant is the combination of a personal and legal bond between two parties, much like a marriage is today between a man and his wife. When a covenant is broken, the personal and legal ties either deteriorate or are dissolved. To be restored as a viable covenant, both the personal and the legal must be restored, simultaneously. Catholic baptism does just that, since it infuses the individual with God's grace and thus makes him personally pleasing to God; and this infusion is also an indelible mark which gives him legal status as God's adopted child (Council of Trent, Ses. 6, Ch 4). Law courts do not have any room for, let alone accept, the personal dimensions of biblical covenants.

In fact, if Protestants insist on making justification solely a juridical enterprise, then this begs the question, for we must then inquire what "faith" is doing in a judicial proceeding? "Faith" is a volitional act of the will to put personal trust in the other member of the covenant for the mutual benefit of both. In a court of law, neither the judge nor the jury cares whether the defendant exhibits personal faith in the judge or the jury. Rather, defendants are determined to be innocent or guilty. If the former, they are set free; if the latter, they are punished. If the defendant is determined innocent and set free, it makes no difference if the defendant says, "but I don't believe in the judge or the jury, and I refuse to be ordered by this court." At that, the judge will promptly call the baliff to have the defendant removed from the court, for it does not matter to the judge what the defendant personally believes about him.

Moreover, if Protestants insist that NT Justification is based on the juridical system of the Roman law court, this becomes a problem since there is no known Roman law (or Jewish law) that allows an innocent victim to take the legal punishment of an accused criminal so that the accused can go free. Dr. Horton's colleague, Alister McGrath, tried to find such a connection in Roman private law, but the only thing he found was a concept called acceptiliation, which, according to McGrath, refers to the dissolution of an obligation by a verbal decree on the part of the one to whom the debt was due, without any form of payment having been exchanged (Iustitia Dei, II, p. 45). But this does not fit the Protestant concept of Atonement and Imputation, since the theory claims that Christ actually paid the debt, not merely let the culprit go free without anyone making a payment to the one owed. Thus, as it stands, there is no legal precedent for the forensic atonement used in Protestant soteriology.

This issue brings up another major difference between the Protestant and Catholic views of the Atonement. Luther and Calvin believed that, since justification was a purely legal enterprise, this meant that Christ had to suffer the equivalent of the legal punishment of the elect in order to redeem them. In other words, Christ had to suffer the precise punishment they would have sustained in Hell, whatever that punishment is.

Although no Father or medieval theologian had ever entertained the idea that the statement in the Apostles Creed that Christ descended into hell meant more than a release of detained saints, the Reformers saw in the descent an opportunity to buttress their forensic understanding of justification. They interpreted the descent as the infliction of the torments of hell on Christ in order to make a full legal payment for sin. Nicolas of Cusa (1400-1464) and Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494) were the first to introduce the idea that Christ sustained agony in the descent into hell. Martin Luther held that Christ, as God and man, literally entered hell to sustain God's wrath, suffering the tortures of the damned.

John Calvin used these concepts and was the first to produce the full-blown interpretation that Christ assumed the legal guilt of the sin for the elect and was justly punished with the torments of eternal damnation. He writes:

" But we must seek a surer explanation, apart from the Creed, of Christ's descent into hell...If Christ had died only a bodily death, it would have been ineffectual. No-it was expedient at the same time for him to undergo the severity of God's vengeance, to appease his wrath and satisfy his just judgment. For this reason, he must also grapple hand to hand with the armies of hell and the dread of everlasting death....By these words he means that Christ was put in place of evildoers as surety and pledge-submitting himself even as the accused-to bear and suffer all the punishments that they ought to have sustained...No wonder, then, if he is said to have descended into hell, for he suffered the death that God in his wrath had inflicted upon the wicked!" INT 2:16:10.

Suffice it to say, this is a thoroughly unbiblical understanding of the Atonement. Christ did not suffer the equivalent of an eternity in Hell. He suffered and died only, and this was sufficient to appease the wrath of God so that grace could be offered to mankind.

For more information on this, see my book Not By Bread Alone, "The Nature of Christ's Sacrifice," pages 37-56, and "Appendix 5, A Critique of Protestant Views of Penal Substitution," pages 333-342.

As for Dr. Horton's contention, ala Alister McGrath, that

"...the best example of the errors in the Latin Vulgate, corrected in tail end of the Renaissance, concerns its translation of the Greek word 'dikaiosune,' which means 'to declare righteous.' It is a legal term, a verdict. But the Latin Vulgate had translated 'dikaiosune' with the Latin word iustificare, which means 'to make righteous,'"

it can be easily shown that McGrath is the one in error here. Here is an excerpt from my book Not By Faith Alone which deals with McGrath's assertion:

In his work, Iustitia Dei, McGrath maintains that in Augustine's translations, his Latin meanings were not faithful to the Hebrew meanings. This echoes the assertion of the German Lutheran, Martin Chemnitz (1522-1586), a student of Melanchthon, who said that Augustine misrepresented the Greek word dikaioun to refer to "making righteous" instead of "declaring righteous." McGrath cites Chemnitz's view on page 29, and elsewhere in the book attempts to show through the etymology and usage of the Hebrew that tsedaqah is a more general word than the Latin iustificare.

Hence, McGrath says Augustine's Latin translation missed the "soteriological overtones" associated with the Hebrew tsedaqah (p. 8). McGrath says these kinds of problems were further complicated by the Greek word dikaiosune which was also limited in scope due to its Aristotelian origins. To support this position, McGrath cites several usages of the Greek eleemosune ("mercy, alms") by the LXX to translate the noun tsedaqah rather than the normal insertion of dikaiosune. McGrath also cites the anomalies of where LXX uses dikaiosune to translate tsedaqah in Lev. 19:36; Deut. 25:15; and Ezk. 45:10; in these instances the Hebrew merely carries the sense of "accurate" not, as translated, "just."

In another example, McGrath cites the translation in Deut. 33:19 which should be "correct sacrifices" instead of "righteous sacrifices." Similarly, McGrath sees a weakness in dikaiosune to translate the general scope of the Hebrew verb tsadaq. He cites the LXX translation of Isaiah 5:22-23 and 43:26 as proof. As a result, McGrath is of the opinion that the semantic range of the root dikaioun was expanded to accommodate tsedaqah. McGrath suggests that the difficulty comes to the fore when the "post-classical" Latin term iustificare is used to translate the "expanded" forms of the dikaioo derivatives.

More importantly, McGrath also asserts that Greeks and Latins had decisively different ideas of the concept of merit, and that this was the main cause for the Latin church's emphasis on merit and the prevalence of merit in medieval theology. According to McGrath, in Greek culture merit was only a matter of "estimation" which is not inherent in its object, i.e., considering an entity to be something that it is not in itself. McGrath asserts that merit, in the Latin culture, refers to the quality inherent in the object or person.

Representative of these two meanings, according to McGrath, is the Greek passive axiousthai ("to deem worthy") and the Latin equivalent, mereri. The Greek word that would have denoted "inherent merit" is meroma, from which the Latin meritum is derived. McGrath's conclusion: the disjunction between axiousthai and mereri is similar to the disjunction between dikaiosune and iustificare. Hence the Greek word has the primary sense of being considered righteous, whereas the Latin word denotes being righteous or the reason one is considered righteous.

All in all, McGrath concludes that the initial transference of a Hebrew concept, to a Greek concept, to a Latin concept, led to a fundamental alteration in the concepts of justification and righteousness as the gospel spread from Palestine to the Western world (p. 15). Unfortunately, McGrath's linguistic analysis and conclusion appear to read into history what his theology dictates.

Despite the anomalies that always occur in translating a word from one language to another, it is a matter of certain faith that inspired Scripture, which translates Hebrew text into Greek text, cannot err, and does not envision the problem McGrath proposes. First, without reservation, the New Testament authors use the dikaioo cognates to translate the Hebrew and Septuagint cognates. These translations occur in many non-justification contexts (i.e., "non-imputation" contexts).

For example, in 2 Cor. 9:9 Paul cites a quotation from Psalm 112:9 and uses the Greek dikaiosune to translate the Hebrew feminine noun tsadaqah (which the LXX also translates as dikaiosune). The context of 2 Cor. 9:9-10 concerns liberal giving, both of God and men, to those in need.

Thus, contrary to McGrath's thesis, dikaiosune is understood as that which is inherent within both God and man due to the good they have done. Similarly, Hebrews 1:9 uses dikaiosune to translate the Hebrew male noun tsadaq in Psalm 45:7 (of which the LXX uses dikaiosune) and speaks of the inherent righteousness of Christ. (The relevance of the LXX may be even more significant here since Hebrews 1:6 is quoted by Paul directly from the LXX).

In addition, 1 Peter 3:12 uses dikaioo to translate the Hebrew adjective tsadeek of Psalm 34:15 (of which the LXX uses dikaious). The context of 1 Peter 3:12 regards righteous individuals as inherently righteous, for it is they who "turn from evil to do good" and "seek peace and pursue it." Similarly, Hebrews 11:7 uses dikaiosune to describe the righteousness of Noah, translating the Hebrew adjective tsadeek in Genesis 7:1 which refers to God seeing Noah as inherently righteous for his goodness in the midst of the wicked people of his day.

We should also add that Scripture does not support McGrath's assessment of the Greek word axioo to refer only to the estimation of an individual rather than his merit (which he distinguishes from the Latin notion of merit that gives the individual the "right" of the third party estimation, i.e., because he is deserving of it). The New Testament uses axioo not only in considering someone worthy but also in recognizing someone worthy because he is actually worthy. For example, Hebrews 3:3 uses axioo in reference to Christ's worthiness: "Jesus has been counted worthy of greater honor than Moses..." This is a common usage of axioo and its cognates in the New Testament (cf., 1 Thess. 1:11; 1 Tim. 5:17; Col 1:10; et al).

Thus we see that Dr. Horton relies on faulty information in the analysis of Alister McGrath.

It is quite remarkable that the Roman Church would continue to embrace its erroneous view of justification, given the advances in scholarship by their own best minds. This is true not only of the 16th century; many Roman Catholic biblical scholars of our own day recognize that the Roman position is untenable in the light of the biblical text. I am not only referring to such controversial theologians as Hans Kung, but to the accepted interpretations of Roman doctrine. Bearing the nihil obstat and Imprimatur of the Roman Church, Sacramentum Mundi is a modern encyclopedia of Roman doctrine. In its article on Justification we read that justification "implies a relation with a judgment rather than a mode of being." The term for Paul, "always has a certain forensic flavour which prevents its becoming a mere synonym of regeneration or re-creation. In later theology, however, this sense is often lost, and justification comes to mean nothing more than the infusion of grace (D 799). Now when St. Paul applies the juridical terminology to the new Christian reality, it acquires an entirely new meaning. It refers now not to the future but to the past (Rom.5:9), not to the just man but the sinner (Rom.4:5). And so the basis of justification must also be different. It can no longer be observance of the law. It must be Christ, whom God has made our righteousness and sanctification and redemption (1 Cor.1:30), which is the same thing as saying that we are justified by faith in Christ (Rom.3:28)." [ by Ricardo Franco, pp. 239-240]

Furthermore, arguably the two most widely respected Roman Catholic biblical scholars, J. A. Fitzmyer and Raymond Brown, have recognized that justification is understood in the biblical text to mean legal acquittal and not a process of growth in inherent righteousness. "Justification in the Old Testament," writes Fitzmyer, "denotes one who stood acquitted or vindicated before a judge's tribunal...This uprightness (righteousness) does not belong to human beings (Rom. 10:3), and is not something that they produced or merited; it is an alien uprightness, one belonging to another (Christ) and attributed to them because of what that other had done for them...This justification comes about by grace and through faith" (Romans, AB 33, pp.116-19).

4) Dr. Horton has given us the key word in his assessment of Sacramentum Mundi, that is, it is a "modern" encyclopedia of Roman doctrine. Sacramentum Mundi does not speak officially for the Catholic Church. Today's Catholic Church is filled with modernist theologians who, in varying degrees, have denied everything from the resurrection of Christ, to the plenary inspiration and inerrancy of Scripture, to the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist; and, as we can see above, the traditional and dogmatic teaching on Catholic justification.

The Council of Trent, which is the only officially infallible proclamation of the Catholic Church on Justification, never taught that justification was legal in nature, nor that the term "justified" contained a "forensic flavor." Dr. Horton knows this, and it is precisely the reason why he took the time to quote above from six of Trent's canons on Justification - - to show how "heretical" Trent was in its formulations.

Now Dr. Horton has a dilemma. (1) Knowing that Trent is the only infallible dogma in the Catholic Church on Justification; and that (2) Sacramentum Mundi (in the representation of "Ricardo Franco" who wrote the article on Justification) is not infallible but merely the ideas of some Catholic theologians who have been heavily influenced by Protestants in the last 30 years, what does Dr. Horton do? He can't side with Trent; he can only attack Trent. But in attacking Trent, he is attacking the infallible doctrine of the Catholic Church, which he knows will never change, and cannot change, no matter how many "Catholic" theologians try to change it. (NB: This is not the first time in Catholic history in which "Catholic" theologians have tried to change Catholic doctrine, each time being unsuccessful, and Dr. Horton knows it).

So what is Dr. Horton's only choice? To make a concerted effort to drive a wedge between the Council of Trent and modern Catholic theologians. The attempt is to make Trent look obsolete, out-of-step, and, in the end, quite wrong. But what Dr. Horton fails to see is that, the greater the wedge he drives between Trent and modern Catholic theologians, the greater the exposure he places upon the modern Catholic theologians as representing, in the estimation of the Council of Trent, a heretical view of justification. It is inevitable. In other words, Dr. Horton is merely proving my assertion that Fr. Raymond Brown and Fr. Joseph Fitmeyer are teaching things contrary to the Council of Trent.

Dr. Horton also proves that views such as Ricardo Franco's do not represent the Catholic view of Justification, regardless whether Dr. Franco uses the term "Catholic" or writes in a Catholic book inscribed with the Nihil Obstat of a Catholic bishop. In reality, what has really happened in the last 35 years is that various modern Catholic theologians have been corrupted by the views of various Protestant theologians, especially from the liberal theological ranks. The most notable of these Protestant corrupters are Rudolph Bultmann and Karl Barth, among others.

After Pius XII allowed Catholic theologians to see if anything good could come out of "higher biblical criticism," which had been used by Protestants for more than a century, Catholic theologians, such as Karl Rahner, Eduard Schillebeeckx, Hans Kung, Teilhard de Chardin, and many others, began using higher criticism as an excuse to depart from traditional Catholic teaching, and as a result, foisted all kinds of aberrant ideas both on Scripture and on Catholic teaching. As Protestant John MacQuerrie of Union Theological Seminary has noted in regard to liberal theology, the Catholics "took the torch" from the Protestants.

Up until his death a couple of years ago, Fr. Raymond Brown was THE torchbearer for liberal theology in US Catholicism, and Joseph Fitzmyer of Catholic University is right behind him. Fr. Brown was the very one who advanced the heretical idea that Scripture is only inerrant in matters of salvation (ie., that it can err in matters of history, and very often does. See his Jerome Biblical Commentary, page 1169). Yet Fr. Brown was made head of the Pontifical Biblical Commission at the Vatican. This shows you how the liberals at the Vatican make sure their own people get the appointments. No one in all of Catholic history has ever advanced the idea that Scripture is inerrant only in matters of salvation, yet Fr. Brown and his new view of Scripture was allowed to have one of its highest chairs. In fact, in opposition to views similar to Fr. Brown's, five Popes since 1864 have officially stated as Catholic dogma that Scripture, ".in all its parts, each and every one, is free from every error.without distinction" (Leo XIII, Pius X, Benedict XV, Pius IX, Pius XII). How does Fr. Brown view the Pope's statements? He tries to tone them down as best he can, and has convinced a number of Catholic theologians that indeed the emperor has new clothes.

I do know a certain thing about Dr. Horton. He believes that Scripture is inerrant in all that it proclaims, for that is standard Protestant evangelical teaching, with only a few detracters. Dr. Horton would have to call Fr. Raymond Brown's view of inerrancy "heretical," for he gives the same label to liberal Protestants who believe there are mistakes in the Bible. So it seems that Dr. Horton and Fr. Brown are in very different camps on very fundamental issues.

The issue of Justification, however, makes strange bed-fellows these days, especially when Catholic theologians, such as Fr. Brown and Fr. Fitzmyer, start saying that justification is forensic. All kinds of Protestant ears begin to perk up, and suddenly Fr. Brown becomes their long-lost friend, even though Fr. Brown repudiates Dr. Horton's view of biblical inerrancy, and many other doctrines that Dr. Horton holds dear to him. These are the kinds of days we are living. Alliances that we would never think possible are happening all the time. One look at the Lutheran/Catholic Joint Declaration on Justification will show that with a little 'snip' here and a little 'cut' there, virtual theological enemies 475 years ago can now become the best of friends. This is even more ironic since I am acquainted well enough with Dr. Horton to know that he would not endorse the Lutheran/Catholic Joint Declaration (and I believe he has gone on record against it), for it is virtually empty of the Reformed distinctives by which he molds his soteriology.

Now, where do all the modern ideas about Justification in the Catholic Church originate? From the liberal Catholic theologians noted above (de Chardin, Rahner, Kung, Schillebeeckx, et al); not from orthodox Catholics. Even 400 years after Trent (and prior to Pius XII's Divino Afflante Spiritu in 1943) you couldn't find a Catholic theologian who would even entertain the idea that Justification was forensic, let alone endorse it in writing. One of the great Catholic commentaries, A Commentary on Holy Scripture by Dom Bernard Orhard, written at the turn of the 20th century, repudiates forensic Justification, as do all the others in that genre.

So, in the end, we find that Dr. Horton's citing of Franco, Brown, Fitmyer, et al, really doesn't amount to much. All it shows is that there are some Catholic theologians who have attempted to change traditional Catholic thinking. This has happened many times in our Catholic history. In fact, I don't know of any century in our two-thousand year history which has been immune from it. But faithful Catholics need not worry, for in due time the errors will be exposed and they will be eradicated. It just takes some time to do so. The Arians weren't totally squashed for five centuries. Fr. Brown's and his theological comrade's aberrant ideas about Catholic Justification are relatively young and novel, that is, compared to other heresies that have come and gone in the Catholic Church. Fifty years of suffering with Fr. Brown's aberrant teaching is negligible when put on the scale of the duration of heresies in other centuries of the Catholic Church. In the meantime, God allows their aberrant ideas to surface and flourish for a while, for as St. Paul says in 1 Corinthians 11:19 "For there must also be heresies among you, in order that those who are approved may become evident among you." God has a purpose to everything, even to the wayward ideas of Dr. Horton and Fr. Brown.

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